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May, 1952
IMPLIED COVENANTS OF THE OIL AND
GAS LEASE
RICHARD P. RYAN
of the Denver Bar
There has developed in the case law of most of the oil and
gas producing states a considerable body of judicial opinion which
recognizes the existence of implied covenants in oil and gas leases.
The purpose of this paper is to outline the covenants generally
and call your attention to decisions of the Colorado Supreme
Court in which some of the covenants are or could have been
invoked. For a thorough discussion of the covenants, you are
referred to some of the texts which have considered them in detail.1
Initially, it should be observed that implied covenants are
not peculiar to the law of oil and gas. They have been imposed
by law in many contracts where a court believed them necessary
to carry out the purposes for which the contracts were made.
2
They have been imposed in connection with the ordinary land-
lord and tenant relationship.-
The oil and gas lease has been a fruitful force for the de-
velopment of implied covenants by reason of its very nature.
By execution of an oil and gas lease, the owner of mineral rights
in land places in the lessee the exclusive right to explore for, to
produce and, in the usual case, to market all oil and gas that
may be taken from the land during the term of the lease. By
such contract the lessor effectively bars himself from taking any
action during the term of the lease to capture any oil or gas that
may be beneath his land, to operate any wells thereon, to market
any oil and gas that may be produced therefrom, or to protect
himself from loss of oil or gas that may be beneath his lafid
through wells drilled on adjoining lands.4 As a result of such
arrangement, in cases where the lessor and lessee fail to agree
specifically on the conduct that the lessee must follow to accom-
plish the purpose of the lease, to-wit, the discovery, production
and marketing of oil or gas, the courts have implied covenants on
the part of the lessee which serve to protect the lessor's interest.
This result has generally been induced by reason of the fact (which
is the usual situation) that the lessor's principal compensation
for executing the lease is the royalty he hopes to receive on oil
or gas produced by the lessee under the terms of the lease.
'Merrill, COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL AND GAS L.EASES, (2nd Edition 1940)
Summers, WtE LAW OF OIL AND GAS, (2nd Edition 1938), Sec. 391, et. seq.
Thornton Oi, AND G.\s-WiLLIs', (5th Edition) Sec. 503, et. seq.
- 14 Am. Jur. 490, Sec. 14.
332 Am. Jur. 145, Sec. 143; Milheim v. Baxter, 46 Colo. 155, 103 Pac. 376;
133 Am. St. Rep. 59 (1909) ;Thomas Cusack Company v. Pratt, 78 Colo. 28, 239
Pac. 22 (1925) ; Boyle v. Bay, 81 Colo. 125, 254 Pac. 156 (1927).




It is impossible when an oil and gas lease is drafted, as it is
impossible in the drafting of any other contract, to anticipate
every situation which might arise in connection with operations
under the lease. If one undertakes to enumerate all conditions
and provide guidance in each case, he will run the risk that by
detailed listing of numerous situations he will exclude what he
might later desire to imply when a situation arises which was
not contemplated by the parties. Conditions that may arise under
an oil and gas lease are literally innumerable. For this reas6n
it is a common practice today to use only a limited number of
express covenants in the lease and to rely upon the now fairly
well defined implied covenants to afford relief when the appro-
priate occasion arises. By employing the implied covenants the
courts have been in a position to require the oil and gas lessee
to do equity under situations which were unforeseen when the
lease was executed. While there are implied covenants on the
part of the lessor as well as the lessee, those most often invoked
run in favor of the lessor.
Many authorities on the subject have undertaken to classify
the covenants implied in oil and gas leases. Our court has itself
had occasion to adopt a classification. In its opinion in Mountain
States Oil Corporation v. Sandoval 5 the following appears:
Perhaps a better statement of implied covenants in
gas and oil leases, such as those in the case at bar, is
that found in Thornton Oil and Gas-Willis (5th Ed.) sec-
tion 503, reading as follows: 'The implied covenants in
an oil and gas lease are generally four, to drill, to de-
velop after discovery of oil or gas in paying quantities,
to operate diligently and prudently and to protect the
leased premises against drainage. The basis of the im-
plication in each instance is the presumed intention of
the parties. "Whatever is implied in a contract is as
effectual as what is expressed. Implication is but an-
other name for intention, and if it arises from the lan-
guage of the contract when considered in its entirety,
and is not gathered from the mere expectations of one or
both of the parties, it is controlling. Light will be thrown
upon the language used, and the intention of the parties
will be better reflected if consideration is given to the
peculiar and distinctive features of mineral deposits
which are the subjects of the lease." * * *.' The inner
quotation in this statement is from the case of Brewster
v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 8 Cir., 140 F. 801, one of the lead-
ing cases on implied covenants in oil and gas leases.
The first of the implied covenants to drill, or, as another
writer has expressed it, to drill an exploratory well,6 will arise
'109 Colo. 401, 125 Pac. 2nd 964 (1942).
'Merrill, supra, Sec. 4.
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in an oil and gas lease where the lease contains no provision for
payment of rental for delay in drilling. Since, in the usual case,
the principal benefit that a lessor expects to receive from the
execution of the oil and gas lease is his royalty share of the oil
or gas produced, it is clear that he will receive no benefit, except
bonus paid for execution of the lease and rental, if any, if there
is no development. He has no right under the lease contract to
drill a well himself. As a consequence, the courts in such a cir-
cumstance have implied a covenant to drill on exploratory well.
FORFEITURE MAY RESULT
In the Colorado case of Davis v. Riddle,7 the plaintiff exe-
cuted an oil and gas lease for a 40-year term in consideration
of what amounted to a 1% royalty, should the lessee see fit to
develop the land and obtain oil and gas. After 18 months, the
lessor brought an action to quiet his title against the lessee. Since
the lessee had done nothing toward development of the land, the
court reached the conclusion that the lessee had forfeited what-
ever rights he had under the lease by his failure to prospect for
oil and gas in the absence of any explanation for his failure.
While the court did not mention any implied covenant on the part
of the lessee to drill an exploratory well, the facts in this case
present a situation where such a covenant will be implied and the
conclusion reached is the same as that which would be reached
had the decision been based upon the implied covenant to drill
an exploratory well.
It should be observed, however, that at the present time leases
of this type are seldom used. Customarily, present day oil and
gas leases contain a provision for the commencement of a well
on the leased lands within a prescribed time, unless the lessee
pays a rental of an agreed amount for the privilege of deferring
commencement of the well for an additional period." In such
cases the parties expressly agree in regard to the terms upon
which the drilling of an exploratory well may be deferred and
no implied covenant should arise. This is the general rule, but,
as Professor Merrill points out,9 there has developed a minority
view which holds that the lessor may decline to accept delay
rental and insist upon drilling.
125 Colo. App. 162, 136 Pac. 551 (1913).
'The following is typical: "If no well be commenced on said land on or
before one year from the date hereof, this lease shall terminate as to both par-
ties unless the lessee on or before that date shall pay or tender to the lessor
or to the lessor's credit in the First National Bank at Hometown, U.S.A., or its
successors, which shall continue as the depository regardless of changes in the
ownership of said land, the sum of One Hundred and Sixty ($160.00) and No./100
DOLLARS, which shall operate as a rental and cover the privilege of deferring
the commencement of a well for twelve months from said date. In like manner
and upon like payments or tenders the commencement of a well may be further
deferred for like periods of the same number of months successively."
'Merrill, supra, Sec. 29.
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The situation in Colorado in this respect is not well defined.
There is one case on the point, Florence Oil & Refining Co. v.
Orman,10 but it is an old case and the opinion does not make
the facts entirely clear. In this case the lessee, under a lease
executed by the State Land Board, was required to drill two wells
to a certain depth by specified dates. If the wells were unpro-
ductive, the lessee was obliged to pay a rental of $50 per year
until more wells were drilled. Failure to pay the rental would
result in forfeiture of the lease. The two required wells were
timely drilled and were dry. Two additional wells were also drilled
within the first two years of the lease and were dry. Drilling
then ceased. Nothing is said in the opinion as to whether or hot
the annual rental was paid, but presumably it was because its
non-payment would afford a simple basis for deciding the case
adversely to the lessee. Approximately six years after issuance
of the lease the Land Board cancelled the lease. The lessee then
brought suit to set aside the cancellation. The Colorado Court
sustained the cancellation by the following reasoning:
Here the number of wells to be sunk during the
first 18 months of the term was provided, but not the
number to be sunk during the remaining 18 years of the
term. As to this part of the term, the lease being silent
as to the work to be done, the implication arose that the
lessee should search with reasonable diligence for oil and
gas to 'success or abandonment'; and because this condi-
tion precedent to the continuance of the rights under the
lease was not satisfied, appellant's rights were at an end.
It is submitted that this decision reaches a conclusion directly
contrary to the express agreement of the parties on the subject
in controversy. The language employed in the lease appears to
leave no room for implication of a covenant to drill further
wells in the event the required wells are dry. This case has never
since been referred to by the Colorado Court. While it appears
wrong in principle, it does indicate that our court is disposed to
imply covenants rather freely.
The second implied covenant referred to by our Supreme
Court is the covenant to develop after discovery of oil or gas in
paying quantities. Professor Merrill states this covenant more
broadly, to-wit: "To drill additional wells,""1 while Professor
Summers states the covenant still differently, to-wit: "If' oil or
gas be found in paying quantities, to proceed with reasonable
diligence in drilling sufficient number of wells to reasonably de-
velop the premises." 12
The statement of the covenant by Thornton and Summers
"0 19 Colo. App. 79, 73 Pac. 628 (1903).
" Merrill, supra, Sec. 4.
I-Summers, supra, Sec. 395.
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does not take into consideration the question raised by Professor
Merrill's statement, that is, what is the obligation of the lessee
where the first well does not produce oil or gas in paying quan-
tities? Where there is no provision for delay rental, it would
seem that in such case the implied covenant to drill additional
wells would arise for the same reasons that give rise to the cove-
nant to drill an initial exploratory well where there is no provi-
sion for delay rentals. However, where a lessee has already drilled
one or more dry holes there is not as strong a basis for imposition
of the covenant in the absence of additional information indicat-
ing the possibility of discovery of oil or gas. Where there is a
provision for delay rentals and the first well or wells are dry,
no covenant should arise in view of the express agreement of the
parties in this regard. This statement is, of course, contrary to
the conclusion of our court in Florence Oil & Refining Co. v.
Orman, supra.
OBLIGATION TO FURTHER DEVELOP
Where a well has been drilled and produces oil or gas in
paying quantities there appears to be no question but what an
obligation to drill further wells does arise, subject to certain
limitations which will be mentioned later. As is the case with the
first implied covenant, this covenant is based upon the fact that
the lessor has, for the term of the lease, surrendered to the lessee
exclusive dominion over the premises so far as oil and gas are
concerned and is unable to develop the land himself. Hence, the
courts have concluded that there is an implied covenant in such
cases to drill additional wells.
The Colorado Court in Mountain States Oil Corporation v.
Sandoval, supra, has occasion to consider the obligation for fur-
ther development. In that case the lease was executed in 1925
and covered 6,000 acres. By 1928 four gas wells had been drilled
and by 1939, when the action was brought, no more wells had
been drilled. A further fact, which no doubt affected the Court's
decision, was the failure of the lessee to supply the lessor with
the production information which he was required to furnish
under the terms of the lease and its failure to pay royalty as
required by the express covenants of the lease.
The trial court found that the defendant had not developed
the property with due diligence and the Supreme Court agreed
with this finding. The court observed that the determination of
whether or not the implied covenants are breached in any case
is primarily a question of fact. As a result of the finding men-
tioned the court decreed cancellation of the lease as to all of the
premises not related to or affected by the four wells which had
been drilled and were still producing. This case indicates that




The third implied covenant is that for diligent and proper,
or prudent, operation of the premises and for marketing of the
product if oil or gas is discovered in paying quantities. This
covenant probably will be the source of a great amount of liti-
gation in the days to come because of advances in the science
of drilling, testing, completing and producing oil and gas wells.
Technical opinion frequently differs with respect to the best method
of spacing, testing, completing and producing oil and gas wells,
and the types of secondary recovery operations that are best
suited to a given reservoir if, in fact, any are indicated at all.
Since, in the usual case, the principal compensation of the
lessor is the royalty which he is to receive on oil or gas produced
and since he has no power to control the operation of the wells,
it is incumbent upon the lessee to operate the wells efficiently and
prudently in order that both the lessor and lessee may receive the
greatest benefit. This covenant has been well developed in oil and
gas producing states and its development will no doubt continue
as improved methods of producing oil and gas are developed.
ROYALTY MAY BE PAID IN KIND
With respect to the marketing of oil and gas produced it
should be observed that in most leases the production is sold or
used by the lessee and the lessor receives his royalty from the
proceeds received from such sale. In some instances, notably in
leases executed by the United States and by most of the states,
the right is reserved to take royalty oil and gas in kind. Such
right would be of little use to most individual lessors and for that
reason it is seldom included in the usual lease. Where the market-
ing of the product is under the control of the lessee an implied
covenant to market the production arises. For this reason the
lessee may not delay the marketing of production to suit some
particular interest of its own, but must proceed diligenely to
market the product, having regard to the best interests of both
the lessor and lessee.
Our court has had one occasion to pass upon the marketing
phase of this implied covenant, although it did not expressly men-
tion it in its opinion. In Hoff v. Girdler Corporation,13 the lessee
had drilled a well and had discovered helium gas. The gas was
carried through a pipeline to the lessee's plant and was sold to
the United States Government until August 1, 1930. On that
date, the government ceased purchasing gas and made purchases
only through the Bureau of Mines from a government plant at
Amarillo, Texas. At approximately the same time Congress pro-
hibited sales of helium abroad. The lessee tried diligently to
develop other markets and other uses for helium gas and, in the
meantime, kept its equipment in good working order. In spite
of its effects, however, it was unable to find a market for the
"1 104 Colo. 56, 88 Pac. 2nd 100 (1939).
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helium, although it was at all times ready to sell the same. The
lessee sued to cancel the lease on the ground of abandonment.
The court denied cancellation on this ground because abandon-
ment is of course a matter of intention and no intention to abandon
was shown in this case. On the contrary, the actions of the lessee
indicated an intention not to abandon. The lessor's demand
for cancellation was denied under the circumstances, but he was
invited to return at a later date if new developments warranted
further consideration of the case. While the court did not men-
tion any implied covenant to market, this is a case where the
covenant would arise but performance would be temporarily ex-
cused because of the circumstances which efristed.
THE MOST COMMON IMPLIED COVENANT
Perhaps the fourth implied covenant is the most widely known
and is the one most often invoked. The covenant requires the
lessee to protect the leased premises from drainage. It is now
generally accepted as a fact that oil and gas are susceptible to
migration in the underground formations in which they occur.
Thus, it is possible for a well drilled near the boundary line of a
leased tract to remove oil or gas which lies beneath adjoining
lands. If the adjoining land owner or his lessee does not under-
take to protect his land from drainage by drilling an offset well,
he may in the course of time suffer the loss of some of the oil
or gas which originally was in place under his land.
As has been frequently pointed out above, the lessor is unable
to take action to protect his own interest because of the exclusive
grant to the lessee of the right to explore for oil or gas. For this
reason the courts have uniformly implied in the lease agreement
a covenant on the part of the lessee to protect the leased land from
drainage. Frequently lessors who are not familiar with the im-
plied covenant to protect again drainage feel it necessary to write
into the lease agreement an express covenant defining the obliga-
tion to protect the land against drainage. It would seem that
this is not only an unnecessary addition to a lease but may even
be unwise. Since the covenant has received universal recognition
from courts which have had occasion to consider the problem, an
attempt to define the obligation in advance may limit the protec-
tion which the lessor might otherwise hope to obtain. A court
might conclude that it was not at liberty to imply a covenant to
protect against drainage which differs in any way from that writ-
ten into the lease.
How much drainage must take place before the covenant
arises? The lessee should not have to protect against all drainage
since production from an offset well may be so small that it would
be uneconomical to drill it. The standard most generally applied
in connection with this covenant, and the covenants for further
development and prudent operation, is that of the ordinarily
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prudent operator. 14 For example, in connection with the covenants
for further development and protection against drainage it is
assumed that an ordinarily prudent operator would drill a well
when it appears that he could recover his costs of drilling, testing,
completing and equipping such well plus a reasonable profit. This
test of course involves a fact situation which must be established
in order to invoke the covenants.
To date no decision of the Colorado Court has been observed
which has undertaken to invoke the fourth implied covenant. This
probably arises from the fact that the majority of the oil now
produced in Colorado comes from lands owned by the United
States. In the extensive development now being carried on in
northeastern Colorado, occasion will probably arise for applica-
tion of this covenant, and no doubt within the next few years
the Colorado Supreme Court will be called upon to define the man-
ner in which it will apply this covenant. Based upon the Colorado
decisions previously mentioned, there is little doubt but what the
court will invoke this covenant when the proper situation is pre-
sented. Certainly, lessees recognize its existence and conduct their
operations with this covenant in mind.
Two INTERESTING POSSIBILITIES
One interesting sidelight on implied covenants is a considera-
tion of the effect conservation laws have upon them. It is possible
to envision situations where, under an implied covenant, a well
should be drilled, but under a conservation law the lessee is pro-
hibited from drilling. The same situation may arise where neces-
sary materials cannot be obtained in periods of national emer-
gency by reason of restrictions imposed by governmental author-
ity. Both of these problems may be presented to the Colorado Court
in the years to come, since we are currently in one of these emer-
gency periods and we now have a conservation law in Colorado.15
It is impossible in the space allotted to give a detailed study
to these covenants. All that can be done is to arouse interest in
them. No attempt has been made to define the remedies that have
been applied. They are numerous and vary with the circumstances.
Litigation in regard to implied covenants is probably just as
extensive as that which involves express covenants and has prob-
ably resulted in as much or more benefit to lessors as the express
covenants for the lessor's benefit which are intentionally employed
when the lease agreement is drawn.
Blood is urgently needed for Korean casualties. Members are
asked to call their local Red Cross office and arrange for a donation.
"Merrill, supra, Sec. 122.
151951 Laws, page 651; COLO. Srr,\T. ANN., C. 118 § 68.
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